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Abstract
This article is the rst one that considers the choice between the di¤er-
ent types of crowdfunding and traditional nancing under di¤erent types
of market imperfections. In contrast to most existing literature we focus
on nancial aspects of crowdfunding rather than on price discrimination
between customers using a new approach on the demand side. The model
provides several implications, most of which have not yet been tested. For
example, we nd that when asymmetric information is important, high-
quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. A low-quality rm
may nd it unprotable to mimick this strategy as it will be taking more
risk to achieve a threshold. This result is contradictory to the spirit of
the results in Belleamme et al (2014), which nds that asymmetric in-
formation favours equity-based crowdfunding. In contrast to Belleamme
et al (2014), in our model, crowdfunding does not have any ad-hoc non-
monetary benets.
Keywords: crowdfunding, asymmetric information, moral hazard, equity-
based crowdfunding, reward-based crowdfunding
JEL Codes: D82, G32, L11, L26, M13
1 Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a start-up company or project by rais-
ing funds from a large number of people. It is usually performed online. In 2009
the volume of funds raised using crowdfunding was negligeably small. Crowd-
funding raised $34.4 billion in 2015. Some analysts predict that crowdfunding
market size will grow at an annual rate of 27.8% and will surpass venture capital
investments in the near future.1 Kickstarter, which is the leading crowdfunding
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platform in the US, has raised over $2.4 billion in pledges from 10.9 million
backers to fund almost 107,000 creative ideas.2
Crowdfunding research is quickly growing.3 As we are writing this article, the
number of empirical papers signicantly exceeds the number of theoretical pa-
pers. Empirical papers on crowdfunding have found the following: crowdfunding
relaxes geographic constraints on fundraising, which inhibit venture capital and
angel nancing (Agrawal et al. (2010)); asymmetric information and signalling
seem to play a signicant role in crowdfunding (Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther,
and Schweizer (2015), Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)); the success of a
project and any potential delays are related to the volume of nancing it re-
ceives (Mollick (2014)); the timing of contributions usually follows a pattern
(Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2015b)). Yet, the literature on crowdfunding still
lacks a full understanding of how entrepreneurs choose between di¤erent types
of crowdfunding and how they decide whether to use crowdfunding or other
types of nancing. In this paper we try to shed some light on these questions.
Often the choice of crowdfunding method is a natural choice. The idea
of shifting equity in a business is an uncomfortable one, and the thought of
having shareholders curating the direction of future business is not something
you can plan for, explained John Hunt, co-founder of Mystery UK which is
a subscription-based secret events company. Our crowdfunding platform of
choice was Kickstarter, which has a number of benets, but mostly it was the
appeal of rewarding those that pledge with products and services, rather than
repayment or equity.4 However, in many cases the choice is not so obvious.
In fact, in most cases this choice is quite di¢ cult. "Crowdfunding sites run
either rewards-, donation-, equity-, lending- or hybrid-based funding models.
Understanding how each one works and its impact on your business is of utmost
importance."5
We focus on the two types of crowdfunding: reward-based crowdfunding
(used by Kickstarter-the leading platform in the area) and equity-based crowd-
funding.6 In the case of reward-based crowdfunding, investors count on some
extra-benets from the company such as future product discounts. Under
equity-based crowdfunding investors will receive shares of the company. Reward-
based crowdfunding campaigns are commonly o¤ered in one of two models. The
Keep-It-All(KIA) model involves the entrepreneurial rm setting a fundrais-
ing goal and keeping the entire amount raised, regardless of whether or not they
2Kickstarter website (June 1, 2016):
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about_subnav
3Moritz and Block (2014) and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2015a) provide a review of the
literature in this eld. For international aspects of crowdfunding see, for example, Gabison
(2015), Miglo (2017), or Hateld (2017).
4L. Booty. October 4, 2017. Equity or reward-based crowdfunding? Hear from both sides
to make your mind up. https://realbusiness.co.uk/scale-up-hub/2017/10/04/equity-reward-
based-crowfunding-hear-sides-make-mind/
5https://www.oship.com/nd-best-crowd-funding-source/
6The same approach is used in Belleamme et all (2014). This paper is probably the
closest to ours as we discuss below. The addition of debt-based crowdfunding does not add
signicantly new results to our model. We provide a more detailed discussion about this later
in the article.
2
meet their goal, thereby allocating the risk to the crowd when an underfunded
project goes ahead. The All-Or-Nothing(AON) model involves the entrepre-
neurial rm setting a fundraising goal and keeping nothing unless the goal is
achieved, thereby shifting the risk to the entrepreneur. Kickstarter follows an
all or nothingor threshold model, so funderspledged money is only collected
if the goal is reached. While other crowdfunding e¤orts do not always follow
this model, it is currently the dominant approach to crowdfunding, and parallels
the way that other funding e¤orts for new ventures work. Our model is also re-
ective of the fact that crowdfunding is an area where production decisions and
nance are closely connected. The crowdfunding method choice directly and
indirectly a¤ects the development of a project and its promotion, production
scale and price decisions.
As was mentioned earlier, the number of theoretical papers on crowdfunding
is relatively small. Note the following. Belleamme, Lambert, and Schwien-
bacher (2010) identify a number of issues related to crowdfunding from an in-
dustrial organization perspective. In their model, they analyze reward-based
crowdfunding with pre-ordering and price discrimination, and nd that crowd-
funding should be chosen over traditional nancing when xed costs are not
too large or when the discount rate is relatively large. In the second model,
crowdfunding is a way to make a product better known to consumers. The
authors argue that non-prot organizations tend to be more successful in using
crowdfunding.
Belleamme, Lambertz and Schwienbacher (2014) compare reward-based
and equity-based crowdfunding. In either case, the funders enjoy community
benets that increase their utility.7 It is shown that the entrepreneur prefers
reward-based crowdfunding if the initial capital requirement is relatively small
compared to the market size and prefers equity-based crowdfunding otherwise.
Belleamme et al (2014) also o¤er some extensions on the impact of quality
uncertainty and information asymmetry. As the authors mentioned, further
research is required. In this paper we nd that when asymmetric information
is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. This is
contradictory, to some extent, to the spirit of the results in Belleamme et al
(2014), which nds that asymmetric information favors equity-based crowdfund-
ing. Note, however, that the objective of their analysis is di¤erent from ours.
For example, they do not analyze the case when the decision about the choice
7 In Belleamme et al (2014) price discrimination is not possible in the absence of non-
monetary benets, and therefore both forms of crowdfunding yield exactly the same outcome
as seeking money from a bank or large equity investors. Some research discovered, however,
that the role of such non-monetary benets in crowdfunding is negligeable (see, for example,
Cholakova and Bart (2015)). In our model, there are no non-monetary benets from crowd-
funding but the benets/costs of crowdfunding (compared to traditional nancing) arise from
natural features of crowdfunding such as market feedback, close connections between produc-
tion and nancing, moral hazard, asymmetric information etc. Note that overall, the focus of
most existing theoretical papers on cowdfunding has been to exploit features of crowdfunding
like the opportunity for the entrepreneur to price discriminate. However, recent literature
nds empirically that market imperfections play a signicant role in crowdfunding. Hence,
our article mostly focuses on the latter.
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of crowdfunding type is part of the model (this is obviously a crucial part of
our model; consequently they automatically do not consider the possibility that
rms can signal their quality with their choice of crowdfunding) so they only
compare the symmetric and asymmetric information cases within each type of
crowdfunding.8
Among other theoretical papers on crowdfunding note the following. Strausz
(2017) studies entrepreneursinteractions with customers before investment us-
ing the mechanism design approach. Under aggregate demand uncertainty,
crowdfunding improves the screening of potential customers. Entrepreneurial
moral hazard threatens this benet. Studying the subsequent trade-o¤ between
screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Ef-
ciency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a margin re-
ecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained e¢ cient mechanisms exhibit
underinvestment.
Hu, Li, and Shi (2014) study the optimal product and pricing decisions in a
crowdfunding all-or-nothing mechanism. When the buyers are su¢ ciently het-
erogenous in their product valuations, the creator should o¤er a line of products
with di¤erent levels of product quality. Compared to the traditional situation
where orders are placed and fullled individually, with the crowdfunding mech-
anism a product line is more likely to be optimal than a single product and the
quality gap between products is smaller. The paper also shows the e¤ect of the
crowdfunding mechanism on pricing dynamics over time. Together, these results
underscore the substantial inuence of the emerging crowdfunding mechanisms
on common marketing decisions.
We build a model of crowdfunding that deals with the aggregate demand
function for a rms product/service. While most existing literature takes an
industrial organization approach with a focus on invidiviudal demands and price
discimination, our approach is more in the spirit of nancing literature. We fo-
cus on the role of asymmetric information and moral hazard. When analyzing
the role of asymmetric information, we assume that insiders have more infor-
mation about the rm than outside investors/funders. However, in contrast
to traditional capital structure literature where the amount of investment is
usually given in advance our model takes into consideration the exibility of
crowdfunding where the volume of investments is driven by the demand of the
customers/funders. In addition, our model incorporates other major features of
crowdfunding. For example, in the case of crowdfunding the market provides in-
tense feedback regarding a rms projects and products. Unlike venture capital
and bank nancing, there are no major investors with crowdfunding, who often
maintain a certain degree of monitoring and control over the rms activities.
As a result, the entrepreneur may be subject to a higher degree of moral haz-
ard (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2013), Moritz and Block (2014), Strausz
(2017)).
We nd that when asymmetric information prevails, equity-based crowd-
8Among other things note, for example, that the proof of Lemma 5, which is crucial for
Proposition 2, relies on numerical simulations, Section 4.2.2 is not nished and, as mentioned
above, the case when the choice of crowdfunding type is part of the model is not analyzed.
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funding su¤ers more from asymmetric information, which is consistent with the
spirit of the majority of nance literature where equity-nancing is generally
most sensitive to the asymmetric information problem. Equity-based crowd-
funing cannot be used as a signalling tool by a high-quality rm since it will
be mimicked by a low-quality rm as the share price of a high-quality rm is
higher than that of a low-quality rm. In contrast, a high-quality rm can
use reward-based crowdfunding especially the AON scheme. This is because a
low-quality rm may nd it unprotable to mimick this strategy as it will be
taking more risk to achieve a threshold. This prediction has not been directly
tested but is consistent with the spirit of the results found in Ahlers, Cumming,
Guenther, and Schweizer (2015) and Mollick (2014) (that the rms nancing
choice can serve as a signal of a projects quality). Reward-based crowdfund-
ing also dominates when the moral hazard problem prevails since it implies a
higher fraction of ownership held by the entrepreneur compared to equity-based
crowdfunding. The entrepreneurs larger fraction of equity is associated with
a higher project quality. Ahlers et al (2015) examine the e¤ectiveness of the
signals used by entrepreneurs to induce (small) investors to commit nancial
resources in an equity-based crowdfunding context. They found that retaining
equity is an e¤ective signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of a
fundings success. It is consistent with the spirit of our result that reward-based
crowdfunding may be preferred by entrepreneurs of higher quality.
Traditional bank nancing may lead to bankruptcy if the rm is unsuccessful.
So the magnitude of the bankruptcy cost plays a role in the nancing method
choice. If these costs are high enough, the entrepreneur may prefer crowdfund-
ing since, formally, crowdfunding does not neccessarily lead to bankruptcy if
the crowdfunding campaign or production fail.9 However, under reward-based
crowdfunding, indirect costs of distress may arise related to the consumer pro-
tection law in case products are not delivered to customers. We nd that a
separating equilibrium where high-quality rms select reward-based crowdfund-
ing can only exist if these costs are relatively high. Also, unlike traditional
nancing, crowdfunding provides market feedback. When this feature of crowd-
funding is introduced into the basic model, we nd that crowdfunding is selected
over a traditional bank loan if the demand for the product is either very small or
very large. Finally, as mentioned above, crowdfunding may be subject to some
specic moral hazard problems. We combine two types of moral hazard (one
related to the costly entrepreneurial e¤ort and the other related to the entrepre-
neurs decision of whether to continue the projects development or withdraw
(Chang (2016), Chemla and Tinn (2017) and Strausz (2017)) and nd a non-
linear realtionship between a rms quality (or probability of bankruptcy) and
the likelihood of choosing crowdfunding vs. bank loan. This is in contrast to
Chemla and Tinn (2017) which nds that the extent of the moral hazard makes
9 In most countries there is no formal regulation that can be used to force a company into
bankruptcy in the case of crowdfunding (see, for example, Gabison (2015) or Moores (2015)).
There is a di¤erence, however, between equity-based and reward-based crowdfunding. If the
rm uses reward-based crowdfunding then the consumers are under the consumer protection
law etc. (Gabison (2015)). We consider this aspect in Section 5.
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it less likely for the rm to select crowdfunding. We nd that a bank loan will
be preferred to crowdfunding when the probability of bankpructy is either very
small or very large. In the former case the entrepreneur cannot credibly commit
to the projects continuation in case the rm decides to use crowdfunding.
Next we discuss the possiblity of creating a more global model of crowd-
funding which can incorporate many di¤erent features discussed above simul-
taneously. This is a very challenging task and at this stage of crowdfunding
theory development it is probably better to focus on the analysis of separate
factors. Nonetheless, we also present several "hybrid" cases that incorporate
several factors and generate new results. Further analysis is required.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and some preliminary results. Section 3 through 6 discuss the conse-
quences of introducing di¤erent kinds of market imperfections into the basic
model and their implications for crowdfunding decisions. Section 7 discusses
the models robustness and its potential extensions. Section 8 analyzes cases
that involve several market imperfections simultaneously. Section 9 discusses
the consistency of the models predictions with observed empirical evidence and
Section 10 is a conclusion to the study.
Table 1. Variables and notations description.
Variable Description
a parameter in the demand function
aj parameter in the demand function for type j rm
in a model with asymmetric information
c unit cost




qt quantity produced in period t in a two-period model
p product price
pt product price in period t in a two-period model
 fraction of shares sold to investors
j fraction of shares sold to investors by type j rm
in a model with asymmetric information
M amount of funds raised using equity-based crowdfunding
Mj amount of funds raised using equity-based crowdfunding
by type j rm in a model with asymmetric information
e the entrepreneurs level of e¤ort
 0 or 1 parameter in the demand function
 probability of bankruptcy
Q 0 or 1 parameter of production success
b private benet of entrepreneur
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2 Basic Model
An entrepreneurial rm has monopoly power over its innovative product or
service. If the rm produces q units, it costs cq in total.10 ;11 The demand for
the good is given by the inverse demand function q = a   p.12 Under reward-
based crowdfunding the rm collects pre-orders for its future product or service.
Under equity-based crowdfunding, the rm sells a fraction  of the rm. Funders
and entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate
is 0. If the rm selects reward-based crowdfunding, it has two options: KIA
(keep-it-all) or AON (all-or-nothing). If AON is selected, a threshold T is set,
T > 0. If the amount of funds raised is less than T , the rm is liquidated.
First consider the symmetric information case for the di¤erent types of
crowdfunding.
2.1 Reward-Based Crowdfunding: KIA
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects p.
2. The demand for the product is determined, q = a  p.
3. If pq < cq, the rm is liquidated (so p should not be less than c).
4. Otherwise, the entrepreneur collects prot pq   cq.13
10Section 7 discusses model extensions and robustness with regard to the inclusion of xed
costs.
11All variables are described in Table 1.
12Some papers use the approach where, for example, there are individual customers with
di¤erent demand functions (see, for example, Belleamme et al (2014) and Hu, Li and Shi
(2014)). Section 7 discusses the models robustness with regard to changes in the demand
functions.
13Note that the focus of our paper is not on price discrimination between consumers (in-
dustrial organization approach). Most other papers that focus on reward-based crowdfunding
have a separate pre-sale stage where the rm tries to receive information about consumers
valuation before starting the retail stage. This scenario is well studied (at least compared
to other approaches). Consumer valuation is common knowledge in our paper. So the
focus is really on other features of crowdfunding such as private information about produc-
tion cost in the case of reward-based crowdfunding or moral hazard issues that generate new
results compared to existing literature. Note that in other papers too if one assumes that
consumersvaluation is common knowledge, the modelling of price decisions would be the
same as in our paper i.e. it would make no sense to separate the pre-sale and retail stages
(at least in terms of modelling price determination). Also note that informational inter-
actions (and informational games) between the rm and market participants is a big part
of our model. For example, the market feedback is modelled in Section 8 but rather than
providing information about consumersvaluation it provides valuable information for the
rm in terms of improving the product quality in period 2 (in the case of the two-period
model). Secondly, in many cases the retail stage does not even exist. The number of back-
ers/funders is so large and the number of pre-orders is so large that the rm starts focusing
on delivering these pre-orders immediately after the campaign ends and does not open it for
further sales (see, for example, https://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/chris-shuptrine/kickstarter-
crowdfunding-_b_9609322.html).
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The rm selects a pre-order price in order to maximize its prots. The
constraint, however, comes from the necessity to collect the amount of money
required to launch production.











Note that p  c if and only if
a  c (3)
If (3) fails, the rm will not be able to raise the funds needed to launch pro-
duction. When the cost of production is too large or the demand for the rms
product/service is too low, the project is not worth undertaking. This comment
can be applied to every type of crowdfunding analyzed below.
2.2 Reward-Based Crowdfunding: AON
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects T and p, p  c.
2. The demand for the product is determined, q = a  p.
3. If pq < T , the rm is liquidated.
4. Otherwise, the entrepreneur collects prot (p  c)(a  p).
The rm chooses T and p to maximize  where  = (p   c)(a   p) if
pq = p(a  p)  T and  = 0 if pq = p(a  p) < T .
The solution is any T such as T  p(a   p) where p = a+c2 , which implies
T  a2 c24 .




This is the same amount as in (2).
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2.3 Equity-Based Crowdfunding
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects  (the fraction of the rm to sell) and sells  for price M .
2. Firm selects p. The demand for the product is then determined: q = a p.
3. If M < cq, the rm is liquidated.
After shares are sold, the rm chooses p to maximize the entrepreneurs
expected prot:
(1  )(p(a  p) +M   cq) = (1  )(p(a  p) +M   c(a  p)) (4)
subject to
M  cq = c(a  p) (5)
Two cases are possible. 1.
M  c(a  c)
2
(6)
In this case the rm will be able to produce an optimal quantity of goods/services,
i.e. it can select the p that is the absolute maximum for (4) as the constraint
(5) is not binding. This price equals p = a+c2 . The cost of production is
cq = c(a  a+c2 ) =
c(a c)
2 M so the constraint (5) holds.
The entrepreneurs expected prot equals









For the optimal solution the condition (8) will be binded because the rm
can always make  as small as necessary. Then we have:
 =
4M
(a  c)2 + 4M (9)
Substituting this into (7), we nd that the entrepreneurs expected prot equals:
(a  c)2
4
2. M < c(a c)2 . In this case the rm will not be able to produce an optimal
quantity of goods/services. We have q = Mc (as long as p  c, the rm will
produce as much quantity as possible) and p = a  Mc .
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For the optimal solution the condition (11) will be binded as was mentioned








This is less than the expected prot ( (a c)
2
4 ) in the case when M 
c(a c)
2 .
The optimal solution is then M  c(a c)2 ,  =
4M






Again, this is the same amount as in (2). This is not surprising given that in
the absence of any nancial market imperfections every type of nancing should
have the same result (similar to Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958)) as long
as they t into the budget constraints.
Lemma 1. If a  c: 1) the rm is indi¤erent between di¤erent types of
crowdfunding; 2) if AON is selected, T  a2 c24 ; 3) if equity-based crowdfunding
is selected, M  c(a c)2 and  =
4M
(a c)2+4M . If a < c, the project will not be
undertaken.
The proof of this lemma follows from the above analysis.
3 Moral hazard: costly entrepreneurial e¤ort
So far we assumed that the decisions about  and p are made simultaneously.
We know, however, that under equity-based crowdfunding, the entrepreneurs
share of the company is less than 100% after funds are raised and therefore the
entrepreneurs incentive may be di¤erent than it would be under reward-based
crowdfunding.14 Hence, we consider a situation where the cost of production
also includes the entrepreneurs own e¤ort. We assume that this e¤ort costs
eq. Following similar calculations to those in the previous subsection, one can
14This is a classic moral hazard idea (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
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Consider equity-based crowdfunding. The timing of events is the same as in
Section 2.3.
Proposition 1. If a   c  e: 1) the rm prefers reward-based crowdfund-
ing; 2) prices are higher and the quantity produced is lower under equity-based
crowdfunding than under reward-based crowdfunding. If a   c < e, the project
will not be undertaken.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix, p = a+c+e(1 )2 . Under equity-based crowd-
funding, the price is higher than it is under reward-based crowdfunding. This
is intuitive because the entrepreneur reaps less than 100% of the benets from
increasing production while bears a non-shared extra-cost, therefore, the entre-
preneur chooses a lower level of production.














If  = 0, (13) will be equal to (a c e)
2
4 . It was mentioned above that it would
be the same value as it would be in the case of reward-based crowdfunding.
When  is positive, the entrepreneurs prot under equity crowdfunding will be
smaller since the derivative of (13) with respect to  is negative. It is consistent
with the idea of agency cost.
4 Asymmetric information about cost
Now consider the case of asymmetric information about the cost of production.16
Suppose that the rm can be either a low-cost (high-e¢ ciency) producer (de-
noted l) or a high cost (low-e¢ ciency) producer (denoted h). More specically,
suppose that c is either equal to cl or ch and cl < ch. Initially the rms type
(the value of c) is determined and becomes known to the entrepreneur. Also let
us assume that the fraction of type l rms equals x.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
15 In this section there is no di¤erence between AON and KIA since asymmetric information
is related to the cost of prodcution and there is no demand uncertainty. When using AON,
the rm should just follow the rule regarding the choice of T established in Lemma 1. In
fact, the same holds in all model variations in a one-period setting. Further, we consider a
two-period variation with demand uncertainty for the rms product/service. In this case the
risk of failure exists if the rm choses AON creating a di¤erence between AON and KIA.
16Later we consider the case when asymmetric information exists regarding the demand for
a rms product/service.
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2. Firm selects nancing strategy: reward-based crowdfunding or equity-
based crowdfunding.
3. If equity-based crowfunding was selected, the rm selects  and sells  for
price M .
4. The rm selects p. The demand for the product is determined, q = a  p.
5. If equity-based crowfunding was selected and M < cq, the rm is liqui-
dated.
6. If reward-based crowdfunding was selected and p < c, the rm is liqui-
dated.
An equilibrium is dened as a situation where no rm type has an incentive
to deviate. Under equity-based crowdfunding, the price that potential investors
will be paying for a fraction of a rms shares depends on their beliefs about the
rms production cost. This leads to the point that if a separating equilibrium
(an equilibrium where rms select di¤erent strategies) exists, it will not be one
where the high-e¢ ciency type chooses equity-based crowdfunding since it will
always be mimicked by the low-e¢ ciency type. This result is typical for basic
models with asymmetric information beginning with Akerlo¤ (1970). On the
other hand, since private information only concerns the production cost and
not the demand side, the informational game does not a¤ect the outcome of
reward-based crowdfunding. Firms will select their prices as in the case with
perfect information and demand will be determined by the demand function,
which is publicly known in this scenario.
Proposition 2. 1) A separating equilibrium exists, where type l selects
reward-based and type h selects equity-based crowdfunding; 2) a separating equi-
librium where type l selects equity-based crowdfunding does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next we analyze the pooling equilibria. We dene a pooling equilbrium as
one where both types of rms select the same strategy. We will also check that
the o¤-equilibrium beliefs of market participants survive the intuitive criterion
by Cho-Kreps (1987). This condition means that the market o¤-equilibrium
beliefs are reasonable in the sense that if for any rm type its maximal payo¤
from deviation is not greater than its equilibrium payo¤ then the market should
place the probability 0 on possible deviations of this type. The denitions above
are consistent with the standard perfect bayesian equilibrium denition (see, for
instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) with the addition of an intuitive criterion
that is quite common in these types of games (see, for instance, Nachman and
Noe, 1994). If multiple pooling equiliria exist we will use the mispricing criterion
to indicate the one that is most likely to exist. We use the standard concept of
mispricing that can be found, for example, in Nachman and Noe (1994). The
magnitude of mispricing in a given equilibrium is equal to that of undervalued
type(s). The overvaluation of overvalued type(s) does not matter.
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Proposition 3. 1) Pooling with reward-based crowdfunding is an equilib-
rium; 2) if pooling with equity-based crowdfuning exists, then mispricing is larger
under that than under the pooling equilibria with reward-based crowdfunding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The idea behind Proposition 3 is simple. As was mentioned previously,
reward-based crowdfunding is not a¤ected by asymmetric information. The re-
sult of this analysis is that asymmetric information favors reward-based crowd-
funding. Asymmetric information does not favor equity-based crowdfunding.
This is consistent with the pecking-order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984).
5 Bankruptcy costs and bank monitoring
In this section we compare crowdfunding with bank nancing. If a rm takes
a bank loan and it is not able to pay back its debt then the rm is bankrupt
and there are bankruptcy costs. On the other hand, banks have a better abil-
ity to monitor and control entrepreneurs.17 So we assume that the manager
(managerial team) has some private benets b from each unit produced at the
expense of the rm when the rm uses crowdufunding. Strausz (2017) ana-
lyzes a similar concept of moral hazard.18 The focus of that paper is mostly
on reward-based crowdfunding and more specically AON. As was mentioned
earlier our focus is primarily on the choice between crowdfunding methods and
between crowdfunding and a bank loan. Chang (2016) also focuses on reward-
based crowdfunding. The moral hazard problem is the decision whether to
invest (to continue with the proejct after observing the amount of funds raised)
or to default. Later we will use this approach as well. Compared to our paper,
their model has a di¤erent approach to modelling the demand side. Chemla
and Tinn (2017) is probably closest to our model in that it compares di¤erent
nancing strategies under moral hazard consideration.19 However they model
the demand side di¤erently and they do not compare crowdfunding with bank
nancing. To simplify the calculations related to bankruptcy we assume that
the production output is stochastic and depends on parameter Q (similar to
stochastic demand in Section 5): Q = 1 with probability  and 0 with probabil-
ity 1  . This implies that bankruptcy will only occur if the rm takes a bank
loan and Q = 0. The bankruptcy costs are denoted by B. As was previously
discussed, in contrast to rm liquidation cases when the required nancing is
not raised, bankruptcy does not occur as a result of failed production if the rm
uses crowdfunding.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects nancing strategy: bank loan or crowdfunding.
2. Firm selects p.
17See, for example, Diamond (1984).
18Also see Xue (2017).
19They focus on the choice between AON and KIA.
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3. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and bank loan was selected, the rm is
bankrupt.
Lemma 2. 1) Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowd-
funding. 2) For given values of a, B and , the rm chooses to take a bank
loan if b is su¢ ciently large; for given values of a, B and b, the rm chooses
to take a bank loan if  is su¢ ciently large; for given values of , B and b, the
rm chooses to take a bank loan if a is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix.
We nd that the product price under bank nancing is p = a+c=2 and p =
a+(b+c)=
2 under crowdfunding. Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower
under crowdfunding because of the extra-cost related to moral hazard issues.
The second part of the proposition states that crowdfunding will be preferred
if the cost related to the absence of monitoring is relatively small, bankruptcy
costs are relatively high and the probability of bankruptcy is relatively small.
Otherwise, a bank loan will be preferred. These results are very intuitive.
Next we consider a di¤erent approach. In general, as mentioned in, for
example, Strausz (2017) the outcome of modelling moral hazard problems in
crowdfunding is quite sensitive to the way they are determined. In the spirit
of Chang (2016), Chemla and Tinn (2017) and Strausz (2017) we assume that
after funds are raised from crowdfunding, the manager (managerial team) can
decide whether to begin production or take the funds and "run away". The idea
is that the quality of the project can play in favor of crowdfunding. The higher
the quality of the project, the greater the probability that the decision-maker
will select it.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects nancing strategy: bank loan or crowdfunding.
2. If bank loan is selected, the rm selects D.
3. If crowdfunding is selected, the rm selects  and sells  for M .
4. If crowdfunding was selected, the entrepreneur decides whether to begin
production or to run away.
5. Firm selects p.
6. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and bank loan was selected, the rm is
bankrupt.









Overall we nd that the condition (14) is consistent with the spirit of Strausz
(2017) and Chemla and Tinn (2017) in that the extent of the moral hazard or the
magnitude of production cost (variable cost in Chemla and Tinn (2017)) makes
it less likely for the rm to select crowdfunding. However, for the case b > 0 we
nd that the link between the rms performance and the crowdfunding choice is
not linear. A bank loan is preferred when either the probability of bankruptcy is
very low (the rm cannot credibly commit to project continuation) or when it is
very high (the risk of bankruptcy diminishes and the importance of bankpructy
cost is smaller compared to entrepreneurial moral hazard in the form of private
benets, which is consistent with the spirit of Lemma 2).
6 Two periods
A two-period extension is very natural. First, it clearly illustrates the di¤erence
between AON and KIA. In the model with uncertain demand, when the cam-
paign fails there is an extra-cost in the form of lost earnings in period 2 in case
a rm uses AON. Another role of the second period in the model is related to
market feedback because it will a¤ect the entrepreneurs information in period
2. Also, a two-stage model reveals the di¤erence between the long-term charac-
ter of earnings in the case of equity-based crowdfunding vs. short-term rewards
in the case of reward-based crowdfunding. Finally, some recent literature sug-
gests that considering consequtive stages of rm crowdfunding is becoming quite
popular (see, for example, Xue (2017)).
In period t = 1; 2, if the rm produces qt units, it costs cqt in total. The
demand is as follows: qt = a   pt. Under reward-based crowdfunding the rm
collects pre-orders for period 1. Since crowdfunding is usually used to cover
the start-up costs, period 2 nancing is not explicitly modelled. The capital
structure and the ownership structure will be the same in period 2 as they
are at the end of period 1. Under symmetric information, the calculations are
very similar to Section 2 (omitted for brevity). We have p1 = p2 = a+c2 and
the rms prot over the two periods equals  = (a c)
2
2 . In fact Lemma 1
holds for a two-period model. It means that under symmetric information, the
rm is indi¤erent between di¤erent types of crowdfunding (note again that it is
similar to the Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958)). Also note that if AON is
selected, T  a2 c24 . If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, M =
c(a c)
2 and
 = 2M(a c)2+2M .
6.1 Demand uncertainty
Some empirical research suggests that it is very typical in crowdfunding for
projects to attract very low or negligeably small amounts of funds (see, for
example, Mollick (2014), Cordova, Dolci and Gianfrate (2015) and Desjardins
(2016)). In our previous analysis, when the demand function is known with
certainty, the rm can choose a threshold T (under AON) such that the proba-
bility of not rasing a su¢ cient amount of funds is zero. We know, however, that
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many crowdfunding campaigns fail. In this section we analyze a case where the
failure of a crowdfunding campaign is unavoidable under AON if the demand
is very low or absent. Let us assume that the period t demand is as follows:
qt = t(a   pt), where t = 1 with probability  and 0 with probability 1   .
t is the demand "shock".20 If t = 0, the demand for the rms product does
not exist. Note that in a one-period setting the demand uncertainty would not
bring any signicantly new results. The reason is that even if the rm fails
under AON there is no cost of lost earnings in period 2.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects nancing strategy: KIA, AON or equity-based crowdfunding.
If AON is selected, the rm selects T .
2. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm selects  and sells it for
an amount M .
3. 1 becomes known.
4. Firm selects p1  c. q1 is determined.
5. If AON is selected and p1q1 < T , the rm is liquidated.
6. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected and M < cq1, the rm is liqui-
dated.
7. 2 becomes known.
8. Firm selects p2.21
20 In Section 7, we discuss an extension with a di¤erent "shock" function.
21Note that the focus of our paper is not on price discrimination between consumers (in-
dustrial organization approach). Most other papers that focus on reward-based crowdfunding
have a separate pre-sale stage where the rm tries to receive information about consumers
valuation before starting the retail stage. This scenario is well studied (at least compared
to other approaches). Consumers valuation is common knowledge in our paper. So the
focus is really on other features of crowdfunding such as private information about produc-
tion cost in the case of reward-based crowdfunding or moral hazard issues that generate new
results compared to existing literature. Note that in other papers too if one assumes that
consumers valuation is common knowledge, the modelling of price decisions would be the
same as in our paper i.e. it would make no sense to separate the pre-sale and retail stages
(at least in terms of modelling price determination). Also note that informational inter-
actions (and informational games) between the rm and market participants is a big part
of our model. For example, the market feedback is modelled in Section 7 but rather than
providing information about consumers valuation it provides valuable information for the
rm in terms of improving the product quality in period 2 (in the case of the two-period
model). Second interpretation is that in many cases the retail stage does not even exist.
The number of backers/funders is so large and the number of pre-orders is so large that the
rm starts focusing on delivering these pre-orders immediately after the campaign ends and
does not open it for further sales (see, for example, https://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/chris-
shuptrine/kickstarter-crowdfunding-_b_9609322.html). Third interpretation (for a two-
period model) is that the delivery of pre-orders and retail stage customers orders is sep-
arated in time and that the consumers may have di¤erent preferences for the product at
di¤erent moments in time (for a two-stage model). So in a two-stage model the second
stage may be interpreted as a retail stage. It may be advantageous for the rm to use
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Consider AON. In period 2, if 2 = 1 and q = a   p2, the rm chooses p2
to maximize (p2   c)(a   p2), which makes p2 = a+c2 . If 2 = 0 and q = 0, the
rms prot is zero.
In period 1, the rm chooses T and p1 to maximize  where  = ((p1  
c)(a  p1) +  (a c)
2
4 ) if p1q1 = p1(a  p1)  T .
 = 0 if p1q1 = p1(a  p1) < T .
The solution is any T such that T  p1(a  p1) where p1 = a+c2 . It does not
avoid liquidation if demand is zero in period 1 but it optimizes the price policy
if demand is positive.








(1 + )(a  c)2
4
(15)
The analysis of KIA and equity-based crowdfunding under symmetric infor-











(a  c) + c (17)
Lemma 3. When information is imperfect (demand uncertainty) but sym-
metric, the rm prefers KIA or equity-based crowdfunding but not AON.
(16) is not less than (15) because   1. If 1 = 0, the rm is not able to
reach the established threshold under AON so the expected prot under AON
is smaller than under KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
The risk of a failed campaign with some positive probability is unavoidable
under AON. Lemma 3 shows that without asymmetric information, one cannot
justify the usage of AON.
6.2 Asymmetric information about demand
In this section, asymmetric information exists regarding the quality of a rms
products and services.22 In particular, we assume that, unlike outside investors,
rm owners know the value of parameter a in the demand function.23 There
some of the points described above and to separate pre-orders and retail in time of deliv-
ery (it helps to incorporate feedback in order to improve products for future sales and helps
deliver products for funders immediately who need them immediately). Some evidence sug-
gests that the delivery of products to funders starts immediately after the pre-sale campaign
is completed (see, for example, https://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/chris-shuptrine/kickstarter-
crowdfunding-_b_9609322.html).
22The case where asymmetric information concerns the cost of production does not bring
qualitatively di¤erent results compared to Section 3.
23Note that asymmetric information exists between a rms owners (founders) and investors
(funders). So it directly a¤ects the price of shares in the case of equity-based crowdfunding
since it will be based on the fundersbeliefs about the rms type. It also directly a¤ects the
pre-sale price in the case of reward-based crowdfunding for the same reason.
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are two types of rms: a = ah for type h and a = al for type l, where ah > al.
Also let us assume that the fraction of type h rms equals x.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: KIA, AON or equity-based crowdfunding.
If AON is selected, the rm selects T .
3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm selects  (fraction of
shares) and sells it for an amount M .
4. 1 becomes known.
5. Firm selects p1.
6. If AON is selected and p1q1 < T , the rm is liquidated.
7. If KIA or AON and p1q1 < cq1, the rm is liquidated. If equity-based
crowdfunding is selected and M < cq1, the rm is liquidated.
8. The market participants update their beliefs about the rms type.
9. 2 becomes known.
10. Firm selects p2.
Lemma 4. A separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
The crucial aspect here is the update of the markets beliefs. Two approaches
can be used. The rst we can assume that the update of beliefs about the
rm follows the normal Baysian rule, which is the case in Lemma 4. Another
approach however that is more reasonable in the case of crowdfunding is that
after period 2 a lot of information becomes available regarding the products
quality as a result of markets participantsinteractions with each other and with
the rm so in peirod 2 it is reasonable to assume that the extent of asymmetric
information is reduced. In fact without this assumption, the results are quiet
"unintereting" as Lemma 4 reveals. However, when the assumption that the
market can recognize the products quality in period 2 is introduced, it makes it
harder for a low-quality rm to mimic a high-quality rm in a two-stage model
and separation is possible as shown below. Also note that in the previous set-up,
the analysis of the pooling equilibrium does not bring new results compared to
Secton 4.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: KIA, AON or equity-based crowdfunding.
If AON is selected, the rm selects T .
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3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm selects  (fraction of
shares) and sells it for an amount M .
4. 1 becomes known.
5. Firm selects p1.
6. If AON is selected and p1q1 < T , the rm is liquidated.
7. If KIA or AON and p1q1 < cq1, the rm is liquidated. If equity-based
crowdfunding is selected and M < cq1, the rm is liquidated.
8. The rms type becomes publicly known.
9. 2 becomes known.
10. Firm selects p2.
Proposition 5. The only separating equilibrium that exists is one where
type h selects AON and type l selects KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix, a separating equilibrium where type h selects
AON and type l selects KIA exists if ( al cah c )
2 <  < 2  (ah cal c )
2. The right side
of this inequality puts an upper bound on the probability of bankruptcy. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. AON is very costly if the probability
that the demand is absent is relatively high. In this case the low-quality rm will
not mimic the high-quality rm. If, on the contrary,  is very large, the values of
(15) and (16) do not di¤er signicantly for the low-quality rm (they are equal
in the extreme case when  = 1) which means that the low-quality rm would
mimic the high-quality rm and benet from the markets optimistic belief about
the quality of rms that use AON. The left side of the inequality places a lower
bound on the probability of bankruptcy. If, on the contrary, the probability
that demand is absent is very high, it would be benecial for the high-quality
rm to not use AON and deviate to KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
We nd that high-quality rms select AON to signal their quality. They do
not select equity-based crowdfunding to signal their quality. This is consistent
with the pecking-order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984).
Next we analyze pooling equilibria.
Proposition 6. 1) If x is large enough, there exists a pooling equilibrium
with KIA; 2) mispricing is larger under a pooling equilibrium with AON than
under a pooling equilibrium with KIA; 3) If x is large enough then the mispricing
is smaller under a pooling equilibrium with KIA than under a pooling equilibrium
with equity-based crowdfunding; 3) If x is large enough then the payo¤ of h in
a pooling equilibrium with KIA is greater than that in a separating equilibrium
where h plays AON.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Proposition 6 we nd that pooling with KIA prevails if the fraction of high-
quality rms is high enough so we can conclude that reward-based crowdfunding
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is pro-cyclical. Intuitively, if x is high enough, the mispricing of h is smaller
in a pooling equilibrium and there are less incentives to prefer a separating
equilibrium.
7 The model extensions and robustness
7.1 An extension with xed costs
Suppose that the xed costs of launching production equals I > 0. The crowd-
funding campaign needs to then cover both xed and variable costs of produc-
tion. The analysis of this extension does not bring any signicantly new results
except Lemma 5 below for a two-period model. In period t = 1; 2, if the rm
produces qt units, it costs I + cqt in total. The demand equals qt = a  pt. Un-
der reward-based crowdfunding the rm collects pre-orders for period 1. Under
equity-based crowdfunding, the rm sells a fraction  of the rm.
Lemma 5. If I is su¢ ciently small ( (a c)
2
4  I), the rm is indi¤erent
between reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding. If I is large, equity-based
crowdfunding is preferred.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 indicates the di¤erence between the long-term character of earn-
ings in the case of equity-based crowdfunding and short-term earnings in the
case of reward-based crowdfunding. Large projects (high xed costs I and high
variable costs c), in most cases, prefer equity-based crowdfunding. It is not
because of the presence of nancial market imperfections but because of "tech-
nical" reasons. Equity-based crowdfunding has more exibility since funders
can count on long-term rm prots. As was mentioned previously, this result in
Belleamme et al (2014) is due primarily from assumptions about community
benets in period 1 when the rm conducts the crowdfunding. These bene-
ts di¤er among funders in the case of a reward-based campaign so the small
size of crowdfunding captures these di¤erences with a high advantage for the
rm, while in the equity-based case community benets are more common so
there is no advantage of having a small scale. As follows from Paakkarinen
(2016), equity-based campaigns are much larger than reward-based campaigns
but rms select equity-based campaigns mostly for the possibility of collecting a
large amount of capital and not to select a better price discrimination approach.
7.2 Other Extensions
Di¤erent demand functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role of
di¤erent market imperfections in crowdfunding. That is why we adopt a rel-
atively simple demand function. In dynamic monopoly pricing literature this
approach is not unusual (see, for example, Demichelis and Tarola (2006)). Most
of our results (such as Propositions 1, 2 etc.) are intuitively sound and will hold
if di¤erent demand functions are used. Alternatively, a sigicantly di¤erent ap-
proach of modelling the demand side can be taken where individual customers
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with di¤erent demand functions are included (see, for example, Belleamme et
al (2014) and Hu, Li and Shi (2014)). This approach is often used in industrial
organization or price discrimination literature. Our focus is on market imper-
fections and nancial aspects of crowdfunding and the approach that uses total
demand functions from investors/funders (the market) is very common.
Case with continuous demand shock. When considering demand uncertainty
we usually assumed that  (demand "shock") has only two values: 0 or 1. In
other words, managers receive an "extreme" signal: either demand is "normal"
or it is completely non-existant. In such a case there is no role for the value of
T as a signalling device. If  = 0, T does not have any importance and if  = 1,
the type h does not have too much choice in terms of T selection. Now assume
that the demand is as follows: q = (a  p), where  is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1]. Here again we nd that when information between founders and funders
is symmetric, the rms expected prot earnings are lower when AON is used
than when KIA or equity-based crowdfunding is used. It is similar to the result
in Section 6.1. If  is large, the rms prot is the same under every type
of crowdfunding. If  is small, the rm is not able to reach the established
threshold under AON so the expected prot under AON is smaller than under
KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
For the case with asymmetric information we found the following.
Proposition 7. If T is very large or very low a separating equilibrium does
not exist. Otherwise, a separating equilibrium exists, where type h selects AON
and type l selects KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
Proof. Ommitted for brevity.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. AON is more attractive when
the required campaign threshold is smaller since it reduces the risk that the
crowdfunding campaign will fail. So if this risk is very small the low-quality
rm will mimick the high-quality rm. On the other hand, if the risk that the
crowdfunding campaign fails is very high, it is benecial for the high-quality
rm to not use AON and deviate to KIA.24
Di¤erent types of moral hazard. In our model (Section 3), entrepreneurial
moral hazard takes place because the entrepreneurs equity stake in the rm is
reduced while his individual e¤ort is costly and this cost is not shared. This
approach is very common in nancing literature (starting with Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976)) and typically creates an agency cost of equity nancing as in our
paper. There are many di¤erent ways to analyze moral hazard issues, for ex-
ample, to explicitely model the entrepreneurs level of e¤ort. This approach is
quite common in contract literature. In nance literature this approach was
used, for example, in Innes (1991). The analysis in this paper revealed the
advantage of debt nancing over equity nancing, which is consistent with the
spirit of our modelling where equity-based crowdfunding has a disadvantage due
to entrepreneurial moral hazard.
24Chakraborty an Swinney (2017) nd that a higher T can be used as a signalling device
by high-quality rms. They focus on AON. We nd that the relationship between a rms
quality and the campaign goal is non-linear. More discussion is provided in Section 9.
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The distribution of types. In sections 4 and 6, which deal with asymmetric
information we use two types of rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is also
very typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results
stand if one considers a case with multiple types. Our analysis shows25 that
most conclusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, equity-based
crowdfunding is an inferior choice compared to reward-based crowdfunding. In
the case of multiple types, however, one may have a semi-separating or even
pooling equilibrium where only the type with the highest cost (speaking about
Section 4) will be indi¤erent between the two types of crowdfunding and all
other types select reward-based crowdfunding. In Section 5, our analysis shows
that the results may hold even in a multiple types environment though more
research is required. The main implication of our analysis holds. In particular,
our results show that there is no semi-separating equlibrium where the average
quality of types that choose equity-based crowdfunding or the KIA method is
higher than those that choose AON, which is consistent with our basic model.
Mixed nancing and more types of nancing. Unlike capital structure liter-
ature, where debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposed to pure
equity or pure debt nancing), simultaneously conducting di¤erent kinds of
crowdfunding is not common. Nevertheless, if mixed nancing is allowed in
period 1, most results will stand. For example, if mixing bank debt and crowd-
funding is allowed in period 1, as in Section 2, the results stand though the
condition (1) can be softened for a rm if it uses equity-based crowdfunding.
Similarly, Proposition 1 stands qualitatively but the formulas will be quanti-
taively di¤erent. In Sections 4 and 6, a signalling equilibrium may still exist
where a high-quality rm uses a mix of reward-based crowdfunding and a bank
loan or a mix of a bank loan and AON, as in Section 6, although restricting
conditions will change quantitatively. Introducing additional nancing strate-
gies such as debt-based crowdfunding is an interesting direction. Most results
regarding the costs and benets of di¤erent nancing strategies found in this
paper are quite general and do not depend on the introduction of additional
options into the model.26 Quantitatively though, some conditions may change.
It is denitely an interesting direction for future research. Note that most ex-
isting theoretical literature on crowdfunding often considers reward-based and
equity-based crowdfunding separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of
the reasons for this seems to be that the foundersobjectives are quite di¤erent
in these scenarios (see, for example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)).
25Proofs are available upon demand. Note that the calculations become much longer and
technically more complicated, which is very typical for multiple type games with asymmetric
information.
26We have analyzed a models variation that included the possibility of using debt-based
crowdfunding. Under debt-based crowdfunding, the rm promises to return inital investments
from funders with interest. We found that the main results of the model are not a¤ected. Some
slight di¤erences exist. For example, when debt is risk-free (which can be the case without
demand uncertainty) debt-based crowdfunding can be used as a signalling tool along with
reward-based crowdfunding. However, in a more realistic scenario when demand is uncertain
and debt is risky, the main result stands that favors reward-based crowdfunding. The same
holds for the modelling moral hazard.
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8 Hybrid cases
Ideally, the next step would be to analyze the optimal nancing policy when
many factors such as asymmetric information, moral hazard, market feedback
etc. are present in the model simultaneusly. This is an intriguing challenge for
future research. One should say that the creation of such a universal global
model is technically di¢ cult and in many cases may not bring many analytical
and intuitively sound results.27 This section provides an example of such an
analysis.
Case 1. Consider the situation where rms have private information about
production costs (Section 4). In this situation reward-based crowdfunding can
be used as a signal of a rms quality. Now suppose that a rm is terminated
(bankrputcy occurs) in period 1, if the rm is not able to deliver its product
to customers and the rm uses reward-based crowdfunding (similar to the ideas
from sections 5 and 6). Gabison (2015) noted28 that eventhough there is no
formal regulation of reward-based crowdfunding in most countries, in most cases
consumers (funders) are under the consumer protection law (which exists in most
developed countries) and therefore a violation of this law can be costly for the
rm. As in Section 4, c is either equal to cl or ch and cl < ch. Like in Section
5, the production output is stochastic in period 1 and depends on parameter
Q (similar to stochastic demand in Section 6): Q = 1 with probability  or 0
with probability 1  . Bankruptcy only occurs when Q = 0 and the rm uses
reward-based crowdfunding. Bankruptcy does not occur as a result of failed
production in period 1 under equity-based crowdfunding since by its nature no
promises are made to funders/investors and dividends are not guaranteed.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: reward-based crowdfunding or equity-
based crowdfunding.
27A good example is capital structure theory. Most of the intuition published in textbooks
for the last 50 years is based on models that consider each factor separately (pecking order
theory for asymmetric inofrmation, trade-o¤ thoery for taxes and bankruptcy costs etc.). For
an example of capital structure theory review and the role of market imperfections see Harris
and Raviv (1991), Miglo (2011) and Miglo (2016). Models combining several factors are much
less popular and much more technically complicated though some researchers suggest that
these types of models are a prominnet direction for future research. Also note that based
on managers surveys, managers only support around 50% (see, for example, Graham and
Harvey (2001)) of basic theories, which means that the precentage of managers that use even
more complicated ideas is even smaller. Crowdfunding theory is a much younger theory than
capital structure theory so it is in the stage of its development where the quality and relative
simplicity of its basic ideas are probably the most important objectives of its research along
with managerial education on these ideas (see, for example, Loane, Ramsey and Ibbotson
(2016)).
28See also Ibrahim (2016) and Moores (2015) for a legal environment analysis regarding
reward-based crowdfunding. Mollick (2015) empirically analyzes the percentage of failed rms
that used reward-based crowdfunding.
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3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected,  is determined and the rm sells
it for price M .
4. Firm selects p1.
5. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected and M < cq1, the rm is liqui-
dated. If reward-based crowdfunding is selected and p1q1 < cq1, the rm
is liquidated.
6. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and reward-based crowdfunding was selected,
the rm goes bankrupt.
7. Firm selects p2.
An equilibrium is dened as a situation where no rm type has the incentive
to deviate. Like in Section 4, since information only concerns the production
cost and not the demand side, the informational game will only a¤ect the equity-
crowdfunding scenario.
Proposition 8. If a cla ch < 2, a separating equilibrium does not exist. Oth-
erwise, if  is su¢ ciently large, the only e¢ cient separating equilibrium that
exists is one where type l selects reward-based crowdfunding and type h selects
equity-based crowdfunding.
Proof. See Appendix.
To explain the results of this proposition, note that Section 4 found that
high-quality rms can use reward-based crowdfunding to signal their quality.
That section did not consider a potential cost of reward-based crowdfunding re-
lated to bankruptcy in the case when the rm is not able to deliver their product
in period 1. This case asks if the result stands if such a cost is taken into con-
sideration. What we found is that the result stands but there are cases when a
separating equilibrium where a high-quality rm uses reward-based crowdfuning
does not exist. The meaning of the condition stated in the proposition is that if
the di¤erence between the rm types is su¢ ciently small, such an equilibrium
may not exist. Secondly and more interestingly is that if the probability of
bankruptcy is su¢ ciently small, an equilibrium may not exist. In this case, a
low-quality rm may still be interested in mimicking a high-quality type when
the latter choses reward-based crowdfunding.
Case 2. Similar to some previous sections, this case considers a model with
imperfect information. However, here we assume that crowdfunding helps the
rm obtain information about demand. Suppose that if the rm uses crowd-
funding, it can improve the products quality after obtaining useful information
about demand in period 1: more specically, in period 2 the demand becomes
q = sa   p; s  1.29 We assume that s has di¤erent values for di¤erent types
of crowdfunding: s 2 fsr; seg ; sr > se where sr is the product improvement
if reward-based crowdfunding is used. sr > se because under reward-based
29Xu, Yang, Rao, Fu, Huang, and Bailey (2014), Block, Hornuf and Moritz (2016) and da
Cruz (2016) empiricaly analyze di¤erent aspects of the informational value of crowdfunding
for entrepreneurs.
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crowdfunding, the funders know that the rms launch of production and, re-
spectively, its survival depend on their pre-orders and the rms response to this
feedback is expected to be very e¢ cient since the rms survival depends on it.30
Also, under reward-based crowdfunding, the funders have a short-term interac-
tion with the rm whereas under equity-based crowdfunding, these interactions
are long-term. So the former incentivizes the funders to provide more intense
feedback. If the rm uses traditional nancing like a bank loan, for example, it
does not get the same feedback as it would with crowdfunding and the demand
does not change in period 2. On the other hand, as in Section 5, banks have a
better ability to monitor and control the entrepreneurs.31 We assume that the
manager has some private benets b when using crowdfunding.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects a nancing strategy: bank loan, reward-based crowdfunding
or equity-based crowdfunding.
2. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm chooses  (the fraction
of the rm for sale) and sells it for price M . If M < cq1, the rm is
liquidated.
3. Firm selects p1. The demand for the product is determined.
4. Firm selects p2. The demand for the product is determined.
Proposition 9. The rm takes a bank loan if sr is su¢ ciently small or
b is su¢ ciently large. Otherwise, the rm selects reward-based crowdfund-
ing. Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if a is either very
small or very large. For medium levels of a, a bank loan is preferred.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is shown in the Appendix that the entrepreneurs prots under the di¤er-















30Note that market feedback represents probably the most important community benet of
crowdfunding for the rm (because it may increase its product quality and repsectively their
future prots) as well as for funders and customers who can enjoy higher quality products
as a result of market feedback. Note also that we explicity model this mechanism in our
model through providing better information to the rm in period 1, which allows them to
improve their products quality in period 2 etc. Belleamme et al (2014) assume that there
are some exogenously given community benets in period 1 as a result of crowdfunding. As
was mentioned previously, Cholakova and Bart (2015) nd that non-monetary benets do not
play a singicant role for funders.
31Other traditional forms of entrepreneurial nancing such as venture capital nancing also






where subscript r stands for reward-based crowdfunding, e means equity-
based crowdfunding and b means bank loan.







= (a  c)2 (18)







= (a  c)2 (19)
Also if
(a  c  b)2 < 4I (20)
the rm will not be able to use reward-based crowdfunding. And if (a c b)2 
4I, the rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding over equity-based crowdfunding.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium decision-making for the entrepreneurs.
The lines represent equations (18), (19) and (20). Letters RC, EC and B
denote the areas where the entrepreneurs choose reward-based crowdfunding,














Figure 1. The choice of nancing in "Hybrid" case 2 (market
feedback, bank monitoring). Letters RC, EC and B denote the areas
where the entrepreneurs choose reward-based crowdfunding,
equity-based crowdfunding, and a bank loan respectively.
As follows from Figure 1, rms that use crowdfunding are either projects
with very small demand or very high demand. Also, entrepreneurs with EC
have a higher I for any value of a compared to entrepreneurs with RC. Overall
we can see that rms with a medium level of demand prefer B, rms with
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stronger demand prefer crowdfunding, rms with a large amount of investments
and strong demand or very weak demand prefer EC and rms with smaller
investments and strong demand or very weak demand prefer RC.
9 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of nanc-
ing.
Propositions 3 and 6 nd that asymmetric information favors reward-based
crowdfunding. Also Proposition 2, 5 and 7 imply that when asymmetric informa-
tion is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. As
was mentioned previously, this is contradictory, to some extent, to the spirit of
the results in Belleamme et al (2014), which nds that asymmetric information
favors equity-based crowdfunding.32 In our model, equity-based crowdfunding
su¤ers more from asymmetric information, which is consistent with the spirit of
the majority of nance literature where equity-nancing is generally the most
sensitive to the asymmetric information problem. Equity-based crowdfunding
cannot be used as a signalling tool by a high-quality rm since it will always
be mimicked by a low-quality rm as the share price of a high-quality rm is
always higher than that of a low-quality rm. In contrast, a high-quality rm
can use reward-based crowdfunding. This is because a low-quality rm may nd
it unproftable to mimick this strategy as it will be taking more risk to achieve
its threshold. This prediction has not been directly tested but is consistent with
the spirit of the results found in Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther, and Schweizer
(2015) and Mollick (2014) (that the rms nancing choice can serve as a signal
of a projects quality). Furthermore, the entrepreneurs larger fraction of equity
is associated with a higher project quality. In our case, reward-based crowd-
funding implies a higher fraction of ownership held by the entrepreneur. Ahlers
et al (2015) examine the e¤ectiveness of the signals used by entrepreneurs to
induce (small) investors to commit nancial resources in an equity-based crowd-
funding context. They found that retaining equity is an e¤ective signal and can
therefore strongly impact the probability of a fundings success. It is consistent
with the spirit of our result that reward-based crowdfunding may be preferred
by entrepreneurs of higher quality.
Propositions 5 and 7 imply that high-quality projects may prefer AON over
KIA. This is consistent with the spirit of Cumming, Leboeuf and Schwien-
bacher (2014). They show that KIA campaigns are less successful in meeting
their fundraising goals. Also, note that the rate of success of campaigns on
32For example, it is well-known in capital structure theory that asymmetric information
damages equity nancing more than debt nancing and that equity nancing can not be used
by a high-quality type as a signal of quality whereas in some cases debt nancing can be used
(Leland and Pyle (1977)). So applying this example to Belleamme et al (2014), who claim
that asymmetric information is more damaging for reward-based crowdfunding, it would be
no surprise to nd that a separating equilibrium where a high-quality rm uses reward-based
crowdfunding does not exist or that there is a separating equilibrium where the high-quality
rm uses equity-based crowdfunding.
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Kickstarter, which only uses AON, is higher than on Indiegogo.33 Proposition
7 suggests that the high-qulity rm can select the threshold level as a signalling
device. Interestingly the result is that it should neither be very low or very high.
To some extent it is consistent with the spirit of the results in some papers in
that higher targets do not necessarily signal a better quality. For example, Mol-
lick (2014) and Cordova et al (2015) found that setting higher thresholds does
not lead to higher camapign rates of success. Further research is required.
Proposition 1 and 4 imply that pricing and production strategies are a¤ected
by moral hazard issues and the costs of nancial distress. In particular, prices
can be higher and quantity produced can be lower under equity-based crowd-
funding. This is consistent with Paakkarinen (2016) that noted that in contrast
to reward-based crowdfunding, equity-based crowdfunding may have fewer cus-
tomers, but higher margins. More broadly, the point that moral hazard issues
related to the entrepreneurial cost of e¤ort and the reduced equity stake are
more important under equity-based crowdfunding is consistent with Gabison
(2015) and Paakkarinen (2016), which noted that equity-based crowdfunding is
much more constricted in comparison to other forms of crowdfunding.
As follows from Moores (2015), the bankruptcy procedure is not clearly
dened in the case of a failed crowdfunding campaign, in fact, the rm may
not even be declared bankrupt even though consumers are under the customer
protection law (at least in the case of reward-based crowdfunding). As noted in
Moores (2015), further development and clarications in this area are helpful.
Our analysis suggests that from a policy perspective higher bankruptcy costs are
benetial for the exsitence of separating equilibria where high-quality rms can
use reward-based crowdfunding to singal their quality and avoid being mimicked
by low-quality rms.
As follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 6, rms should avoid crowdfund-
ing if moral hazard considerations related to the weak ability of funders to
monitor the rm (compared to traditional nancing from bank loans or ven-
ture capital nancing) are very important. These results are consistent with Xu
(2017), which nds that entrepreneurs switch between crowdfunding an bank
borrowing depending on the relative costs of nancing. Perhaps more interest-
ingly is that if we only consider reward-based crowdfunding vs. bank nancing
(the area above line (20) in Figure 1), projects with high I and high a, i.e
potentially high risk, high investment (novelty) and potentially high demand
(a) will prefer crowdfunding vs. bank nancing. This is also consistent with
Xu (2017). Also we nd that rms should use crowdfunding for projects with
either a very small demand or a very high demand. Firms that use equity-based
crowdfunding have a higher amount of xed costs compared to entrepreneurs
with reward-based crowdfunding. Finally as suggested in Proposition 4, the link
between the rms quality (probability of bankruptcy) and the choice between
nancing strategies is not linear. For example, a bank loan should be selected





mentioned previously, this is in contrast to Chemla and Tinn (2017). They
found that lower performance/higher magnitude of production cost (variable
cost) makes it less likely for the rm to select crowdfunding.
Finally note that Proposition 6 suggested that KIA is procyclical. As far as
we know no empirical research exists testing this prediction directly. Further
research is expected. Interestingly, Zhang, Datta and Kannan (2017) nd that
crowdfunding can be seen as a substitute to bank loans in terms of overall dy-
namics. Previous literature found that debt nancing is countercyclical (Choe,
Masulis and Nanda (1993)). Note also the famous negative correlation between
debt and protability (Titman and Wessels (1988)) so the result in Zhang, Datta
and Kannan (2017) is indirectly consistent with our prediction.
The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Market imperfections and the models results.
Market imperfection(s) Results
Asymmetric information Good quality projects prefer
about production cost reward-based crowdfunding
Entrepreneurs moral hazard Firms prefer reward-based
due to his reduced equity stake crowdfunding. Prices are higher and
quatity produced is lower
under equity-based crowdfunding
Asymmetric information "Signalling by risk-bearing".
about demand Low-quality rm selects KIA or
equity-based crowdfunding and
the high-quality rm selects AON.
KIA is counter-cyclical
Bankruptcy costs vs. Prices are higher and quantity
bank monitoring case 1 produced is lower under crowdfunding than
under a bank loan; crowdfunding
is selected over a bank loan
when private benets are low,
the demand is low and the
probability of bankruptcy is high
Asymmetric information with Signlling with AON: the threshold should
continuous demand shock neither be very small nor very large
Bankruptcy costs vs. Non-linear relationship between
bank monitoring case 2 the probability of bankruptcy and
the projects quality and the choice
between crowdfunding and a bank loan
Hybrid case 1 If bankrupcy costs are
(asymmetric high, rms use
information about demand reward-based crowdfunding
and bankruptcy costs) to signal their quality
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Market imperfection(s) Results
Hybrid case 2 Prices are higher and quantity
(market feedback, produced is lower under crowdfunding.
bank monitoring) Crowdfunding is selected
over a traditional bank
loan if demand is either
very small or very large.
10 Conclusions
This paper is the rst one that considers the choice between AON, KIA and
equity-based crowdfunding under di¤erent types of market imperfections using
a new approach with the demand side. The closest one is Belleamme et al
(2014) that analyses AON and equity-based crowdfunding under asymmetric
information but uses a di¤erent demand approach and some other special fea-
tures such as non-monetary ad-hoc benets etc. The main innovation in terms
of methods used and the papers contribution lies with asymmetric information.
However, the paper is structured in such a way that other market imperfections
are analysed as well. The structure of the model is quite simple and allows for
that. For example, we obtain several interesting results with regard to moral
hazard. Existing theoretical literature on crowdfunding has extensively focused
on such features of crowdfunding as price discrimination. This paper focuses on
information aspects of crowdfunding, which is more in the spirit of nance lit-
erature than industrial organization literature. In addition to traditional forms
of markets imperfections (asymmetric information, moral hazard, bankruptcy
costs etc.) our model includes some other features of crowdfunding such as
market feedback. Another contribution to exisitng literature is that we analyze
a dynamic (two-period) model of crowdfunding. Most existing theoretical pa-
pers on crowdfunding consider static models. The presence of two production
periods allows us to capture an essential di¤erence between reward-based and
equity-based crowdfunding: under equity-based crowdfunding funders can count
on long-term rm prots.
The model provides several implications, most of which have not yet been
tested. When asymmetric information is important, high-quality projects prefer
reward-based crowdfunding. This is opposite, to some extent, to the spirit of
the results in Belleamme et al (2014), which nds that asymmetric information
favors equity-based crowdfunding. Also, we nd that the choice of the all-or-
nothing mechanism as opposed to keep-it-all can serve as a signal of a rms
quality. Among other ndings note the following. Prices can be higher and
quantity produced can be lower under equity-based crowdfunding than under
reward-based crowdfunding due to distortions created by moral hazard problems
relarted to the cost of entrepreneurial e¤ort. Firms should avoid crowdfunding
if moral hazard considerations related to the weak ability of funders to monitor
the rm (compared to traditional nancing from bank loans or venture capital
nancing) are very important. The link between the rms quality (probability
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of bankruptcy) and the choice between nancing strategies is not linear. For
example, a bank loan should be selected over crowdfunding if this probabil-
ity is either very low or very high. This is in contrast to Chemla and Tinn
(2017). They found that lower performance/higher production cost (variable
cost) makes it less likely for the rm to select crowdfunding.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. After shares are sold, the rm chooses p (correspond-
ingly q = a  p) to maximize
(1  )(p(a  p) +M   cq)  e(a  p) (21)
subject to M  cq. Two cases are possible. If a+c+e(1 )2  a  
M
c we have
p = a+c+e(1 )2 . Otherwise we have a corner solution p =
ca M
c . In both
cases, under the optimal strategy chosen by the rm M = cq.
The funders anticipate this and therefore M and  will be connected as
follows:









Substituting this into (21) we get that the entrepreneurs expected prot is equal
to:
(p  c  e)(a  p) (23)




c is not optimal. The rm should increaseM and  becasue
of the following. (23) is concave in p and p = a+c+e2 is an optimal p in (23).
Further p = a+c+e(1 )2 is closer to the optimum than p =
ca M
c . So we have
p = a+c+e(1 )2 .














If  = 0, (24) will be equal to (a c e)
2
4 . This is the same value that we under
a reward-based crowdfunding scenario. When  is positive, the entrepreneurs
prot under equity crowdfunding will be smaller since the derivative of (24) in
 is negative.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a situation where l selects reward-based
crowdfunding and h selects equity-based crowdfunding. We have (all calcula-


















We will assume Mh =
ch(a ch)
2 . The proof is similar for any value of Mh. For
simplicity we assume that Mh has the lowest value from the range of possible
values. It can also be justied if moral hazard is present (as described in Sec-






h does not have an incentive to mimick l since, as mentioned above, in this
section asymmetric information does not concern reward-based crowdfunding.
So if h chose reward-based crowdfunding it would have the same payo¤ as it
would in equilibrium: (a ch)
2
4 . Now suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-
based crowdfunding instead. ls prot lh then equals
lh = (1  h)(pq +Mh   clq) (27)
In this equation p and q are discussed below. Note that when l mimicks h,
it has to sell a larger stake of equity in the rm compared to the symmetric




This is smaller than (26) because cl < ch. Note that the amount of funds raised
will also be di¤erent than under symmetric information.







The left side of this condition shows the cost of production by type h under
symmetric information and the right side shows that for type l. If (28) holds,
l will be able to raise enough funds to produce an optimal quantity of goods.
Indeed the choice of p is determined by maximizing (27) under the condition
that
Mh  clq (29)
Absolute maximum is p = a+cl2 and if condition (28) holds, the constraint (29)











h   c2l < 2a(ch   cl).
This holds because cl < ch < a. So l will not mimick h.
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Second case is when (28) does not hold. In this case l is not able to pro-
duce the quantity that would be optimal under symmetric information. Two







Since ph = a+ch2 , this equals
ch(a ch)
2cl
. The entrepreneurs prot then equals
lh = (1   2cha+ch )(a  
ch(a ch)
2cl
) ch(a ch)2cl . This is less than
(a cl)2
4 because (28)
does not hold and cl < ch. Indeed the inequality lh <
(a cl)2
4 can be written as
c2h(a ch)2(2acl ach+c2h) < (a cl)2c2l ch(a+ch). Here c2h(a ch)2 < (a cl)2c2l
because (28) does not hold and 2acl   ach + c2h < ch(a+ ch) because cl < ch.
2. Mh > clq. This is only possible if p  cl. Otherwise it makes no sense
to keep unused cash because the production of extra unitis brings prot. In
this case the rms prot equals: (1  2cha+ch )ch(
a ch
2 ). This is less than
(a cl)2
4
because cl < ch.
Therefore l will not mimick h.
Now consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l
selects equity-based crowdfunding. Suppose that h mimics l and chooses equity-










This is greater than (25) because cl < ch. Therefore h will mimick l. This
means that such an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a pooling equilibrium where both types se-
lect reward-based crowdfunding, which is supported by o¤-equilibrium market
beliefs that the rm is h if the market participants observe equity-based crowd-
funding. First of all, let us verify non-deviation for each type to equity-based
crowdfunding. Since under pooling with reward-based crowdfunding ls payo¤
is the same as in the separating equilibrium in Proposition 2, it follows from
the proof of Proposition 2 that l does not deviate. h does not deviate because
it gets the same amount as in equilibrium.
Let us now verify that o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion
of Cho and Kreps (1987). To show this, let us calculate the maximal payo¤
of type h in the case that it plays equity-based crowdfunding. Its payo¤ is
evidently maximized if the markets beliefs place the probability 1 on type l
observing equity. If o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion, this
expression must be not less than the payo¤ of h in equilibrium.34 It follows
from our analysis of the separating equilubrium above that the payo¤ of h will
be higher than its equilibtum payo¤ if the market places the probbaility of 1 on
type l.
34Otherwise the market should place the probability 0 that h deviates to equity.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Consider crowdfunding. After the shares are sold, the
rm chooses p to maximize (1  )(p(a  p) +M   (c+ b)q) subject to






The rms expected prot is p(a   p) =  (a+(c+b)=)(a (c+b)=)4 . The funders
expected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
(
(a+ (c+ b)=)(a  (c+ b)=)
4
) M (32)
Under the optimal solution the conditions (30) and (32) will be binded be-


















Consider bank loan nancing. The rm maximizes (p(a   p)   F )   (1  
)B   c(a  p) subject to: pq = p(a  p)  cq = c(a  p). F is the face value of
debt.





The comparison of (31) and (34) leads to the rst part of Lemma 2.
The bankers expected payo¤ equals: F = c(a p) = c(a  a+c=2 ) = c
a c=
2 .
It implies F = c(a c)22 .







  (1  )B (35)
The comparison of (33) and (35) leads to the second part part of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider crowdfunding. After the shares are sold, the
entrepreneur decides whether to run away or start the production. If he decides
to start the production, the rm chooses p to maximize (1 )(p(a p)+M cq)
subject to







The rms expected prot is p(a p) =  (a+c=)(a c=)4 . The fundersexpected





Under the optimal solution the conditions (36) and (38) will be binded be-


















If the entrepreneur decides to run away, his prot is equal to M = cq =
c(a  a+c=2 ) = c
a c=




Consider bank loan nancing. The rm maximizes (p(a   p)   F )   (1  
)B   c(a  p) subject to: pq = p(a  p)  cq = c(a  p). F is the face value of
debt.
The solution gives us p = a+c=2 .
The bankers expected payo¤ equals: F = c(a p) = c(a  a+c=2 ) = c
a c=
2 .
It implies F = c(a c)22 .







  (1  )B (41)
The comparison of (39) and (41) leads to the rst part of Proposition 4.
If b > 0, condition (40) will be: c+b  a3 or  
3(b+c)




Then one can compare this with (35): this leads to the second part of the





or   4B 2ab+
p
16B2 16abB+4a2b2+6Bb2
8B a bank loan is better than crowd-
funding.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a situation where type l selects KIA and type
h selects AON. First we have
h =








where j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in Section 6.1). Suppose






















Comparing with (42) we nd that h does not deviate if
1 + 
2
 ( al   c
ah   c
)2 (45)
Note that conditions (44) and (45) can not hold simultaneously because
  1 and therefore this equilibirum does not exist.
The proof is similar for other cases so it is omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider a situation where type l selects KIA and
type h selects AON. First we have
h =







where j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in Section 6.1). Suppose
that l mimics h and chooses AON. We have














Comparing this with (47) we nd that the former is greater if




and therefore type l has no incentive to deviate.







) + (1  ) (al   c)
2
4
Comparing with (46) we nd that h does not deviate if





Note that conditions (48) and (49) do not contradict each other. It is because
the right side of (49) is smaller than that of (48). Indeed let x = ( al cah c )
2. Then
the following makes the comparison described in the previous sentence:
x < 2  1
x
, which always holds. For brevity, we omit the analysis of equilibrium and
also the case where type l selects equity-based crowdfunding and type h selects
AON.







(1 + )(al   c)2
4
(51)







) + (1  ) (ah   c)
2
4
This is greater than (51) because ah > al and  < 1. So a situation where type
h selects KIA and type l selects AON is not an equilibrium.









(if l selects KIA, (52) holds as an equality). Suppose that l mimics h and chooses
equity-based crowdfunding. ls prot lh then equals




c+ (ah   c)
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This is greater than (52) because al < ah. Therefore l will mimic h and such
an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider a pooling equilibrium where both types
select KIA, which is supported by o¤-equilibrium market beliefs that the rm is
l if the market participants observe AON or equity-based crowdfunding. First
of all, let us verify non-deviation for each type to equity-based crowdfunding. h








where am = xah + (1   x)al.35 If h deviates to equity-based crowdfunding it
gets .

















Note that it follows from (17) that Ml =
c(al c)
2 < Mh =
c(ah c)
2 because
al < ah so h will not be able to produce the optimal quantity if h deviates to
equity-based crowdfunding. (53) is greater than (54) if
(am   c)2 >
(al   c)2(2ah   al + c)  c(ah   c)2
(c+ (al   c))
(55)









This is less than (53) because al  am so h does not deviate.
O¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
The proof is omitted for brevity.
Now let us analyze the mispricing. Consider pooling with equity-based
crowdfunding. hs prot h equals










35Note that in period 1 the funderspre-orders are based on the belief that the quality of
the product is average since it is a pooling equilibrium where all rms use the same strategy.


















From the comparison of (53) and (57) it follows that pooling with KIA dom-
inates pooling with AON. Now let us compare KIA and equity-based crowd-
funding. (53) is greater than (56) if
(am   c)2(2ah   c  2am + 2c) < c(ah   c)2
If x is su¢ ciently large, it holds. Indeed in the extreme case when x = 1 and
respectively am = ah, this condition becomes  < 1. This completes the second
part of the proposition.













So if x is su¤ciently large, pooling with KIA dominates.
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider reward-based crowdfunding.




In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1   c)(a   p1)   I subject to: p1q1 =
p1(a   p1)  I + cq1 = I + c(a   p1). This condition means that the amount
of pre-orders should cover the start-up cost (xed costs and period 1s variable
costs).




then p1 = a+c2 .











If (58) fails, the rm will not be able to raise the funds needed to launch
production. When the required amount of initial investment is quite large,
reward-based crowdfunding may not be an option.
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The analysis of equity-based crowdfunding is omitted for brevity (it is very
similar to the analysis in Section 6).
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider a situation where l selects reward-based
crowdfunding and h selects equity-based crowdfunding.
Consider rm h. Calculations are similar to those in Section 4. In period 2,
the rm chooses p2 to maximize the entrepreneurs prot (1 )(p2 ch)(a p2),
which makes p2 =
a+ch=
2 .
In period 1, after the shares are sold, the rm chooses p1 to maximize (1 
)(p1(a  p1) +M   chq1) subject to
M  cq1 (60)
. It implies: p1 =
a+ch=
2 . The rms expected prot in period 1 is p1(a p1) =









Under the optimal solution the conditions (60) and (61) will be binded be-

























Consider rm l. In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize (p2 cl)(a p2)
which makes p2 =
a+cl=
2 . The rms expected prot in period 2 is
(a cl=)2
4
In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1(a p1)+ (a cl=)
2
4 ) cl(a p1) subject
to: p1q1 = p1(a  p1)  clq1 = cl(a  p1). The solution gives us p1 = a+cl=2 .








(1 + )(a  cl=)2
4
(63)
Suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. ls
prot lh then equals



























The left side of this inequality is decreasing in  and the right side is increasing
in . So we have two cases. If a cla ch < 2, the condition (65) does not hold for
0 <   1 and a separating equilibrium does not exist. Otherwise it holds if 
is su¢ ciently high.
Secondly, in order to have an equilibrium, h should not have an incentive to
switch to reward-based crowdfunding. In this case, this is a trade-o¤ between
bankruptcy cost and the cost of moral hazard. If h switches to reward-based
crowdfunding its payo¤ equals:
hl =
(1 + )(a  ch=)2
4
This is less than (62).
Consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l selects
equity-based crowdfunding.
Consider rm l. Similarly to the above analysis we have: p1 = p2 =
a+cl=
2 ,




Consider rm h. We have p1 = p2 =
a+ch=
2 .
The rms prot over the two periods equals
h =
(1 + )(a  ch=)2
4
(67)
Suppose that h mimics l and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. hs
prot hl then equals





This is greater than (67) because cl < ch and therefore such an equilibrium does
not exist.
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider reward-based crowdfunding. In period 2,
the rm chooses p2 to maximize (p2 c b)(sra p2) which makes p2 = sra+b+c2
41
(all calculations are identical to those in section 2.1. except that the cost equals
c+ b).
In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1   b   c)(a   p1) subject to p1q1 =
(p1   c)(a  p1)  cq1 = c(a  p1).
Two cases are possible. If
(a  c  b)2 < 4I (68)
then the rm will not be able to raise enough funds to launch the production.
Otherwise we have p1 = a+c+b2 .








Consider equity-based crowdfunding. In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maxi-
mize (1  )(p2   c  b)(sea  p2) which makes p2 = sea+b+c2 .




The rms prot equals























In the case of bank loan nancing we have p1 = p2 = a+c2 .





Since (69) is greater than (70) we have two cases. Resulting from the com-
parison of (69) and (70), the rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding to equity-
based crowdfunding because sr > se. As follows from the comparison of (69)
and (71), the rm selects reward-based crowdfunding if sr is su¢ ciently large
or b is su¢ ciently small. This is not surprising given that b reects the degree
of the moral hazard cost under crowdfunding and sr reects the e¢ ciency of
market feedback. Otherwise, the rm takes a bank loan.
Let us now analyze the role of demand (a) on a rms decision-making. The
















= (a  c)2 (72)
Since this is a quadratic equation, it implies that for any given value of I,
the rm selects equity-based crowdfunding if a is either very small or very large.
Otherwise it takes a bank loan.
It was shown previously, the entrepreneurs prots under the di¤erent strate-



















where subscript r stands for reward-based crowdfunding, e means equity-
based crowdfunding and b means bank loan.







= (a  c)2 (73)







= (a  c)2 (74)
Also if
(a  c  b)2 < 4I (75)
the rm will not be able to use reward-based crowdfunding. And if (a c b)2 
4I, the rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding over equity-based crowdfunding.
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